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MAY-JUNE, 1962
ONE YEAR REVIEW OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE AND APPEALS
By WILLIAM H. ERICKSON*
Justice is no longer delayed in the Supreme Court of Colorado.
The court's departmental method of determining cases has made it
possible for oral argument to be held within three months after
issue is formed by the briefs in nearly every case. In 1961, 354 opi-
nions were rendered by the court. Many of the controversies which
existed in the interpretation of the Rules of Civil Procedure have
now been resolved. This article will review the cases which altered
or changed the court's interpretation of the Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, but will necessarily be limited due to the number of cases
which appeared before the court and involved the interpretation
of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
RULE 4
The invalidity of a summons issued by an attorney pursuant
to Rule 4 (b), and not signed by him was the primary issue in Brown
v. Amen.1 A default judgment was taken against Brown, set aside
on Brown's motion, and then reinstated when a rehearing was held.
Brown and a witness called by him were found to be in contempt
at the time the default was reinstated. The supreme court, in re-
viewing the validity of the default judgment and the contempt
order, presumed that the copy of the summons served on Brown was
not signed, because the original summons admittedly was not
signed. Brown's appearance and motion to set aside the default
judgment granted jurisdiction over the person, which supported the
trial court's imposition of a sentence for contempt. However, it
failed to have the retroactive force which would allow the rein-
statement of the default and merely granted the court jurisdiction
to set a time for Brown to plead or answer. The service of the void
summons was held by the court to be ineffective to bring the de-
fendants within the jurisdiction of the court, and the default judg-
ment was therefore set aside.
RULE 9
Lamberson v. Thomas,2 was a quiet title action where the de-
fendant successfully proved title to mineral rights under a condem-
nation decree which awarded title to the defendant's predecessor
in interest. Rule 9 (e) came into play when a general denial formed
the plaintiff's basis for questioning the validity of the condemna-
tion decree upon which the defendant relied to prove superior title.
After quoting Rule 9 (e), the court said:
If there were grounds upon which the condemnation
decree could be assailed, the plaintiff was in no position
to do it. Her "Reply to Amendment to Answer and Counter-
claim" was only a general denial of the second, third and
* Member of the Denver and Colorado Bar Ass'ns and of the Denver firm of Hindry, Erickson and
Meyer.
1 364 P.2d 735 (Colo. 1961).
2 362 P.2d 180 (Colo. 1961).
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fourth defenses of defendants' amendment to answer. A
general denial of the validity of the decree is not sufficient
to assail it. Rule 9 (e) provides:
"In pleading a judgment or decision of a court ***
it is sufficient to aver [it] without setting forth matter
showing jurisdiction to render it. A denial of jurisdic-
tion shall be made specifically and with particularity
and when so made the party pleading the judgment
or decision shall establish on the trial all controverted
jurisdictional facts."
The above manner of pleading is prescribed not only
to simplify the pleadings relating to judgments, but also to
apprise the pleader of a judgment or decision of a court
that it is being challenged, for jurisdictional reasons as well
as the particular grounds of the attack upon it; and for the
further purpose of preventing final judgments and deci-
sions of courts from being overthrown unadvisedly.
[I]f the plaintiff intended to attack the decree upon
jurisdictional grounds she was required to give notice to
the defendants by specifically denying jurisdiction and al-
leging with particularity the grounds showing lack of juris-
diction. Under the present system of pleading, the manda-
tory provisions of Rule 9(e) are not waived by the first
pleader's having alleged jurisdictional facts in support of
a judgment or decree. Contrary rulings by this court under




The plaintiff in Roblek v. Horst,4 was not permitted to retain
possession of a Cadillac which he had obtained by a writ of replevin
when he sought to defend his possession on the ground that he had
been fraudulently induced to release his chattel mortgage on the
Cadillac. In holding that the plaintiff failed to establish his defense
of fraud, the court said:
Fraud was neither pleaded nor proved in the manner
and with the particularity required by Rule 9(b), Colo.
R.C.P. and Ginsberg v. Zagar, 126 Colo. 536, 251 P.2d 1080.
The trial court under the present record was correct in di-
recting a verdict for Frazer and against Roblek for posses-
sion of the Cadillac. There was no issue of fact to be re-
solved by the jury, but only an issue of law to be resolved
by the court.5
RULE 9 (e)
Rule 9(e) again found its way before the court in Superior
Distributing Corp. v. White,6 where full faith and credit was given
to a judgment entered in Mississippi. The defendants had appeared
specially in the Mississippi courts to quash the service and, after
a hearing, were granted time to plead or answer when their motion
was denied. When the Mississippi judgment was placed at issue in
Colorado, the defendants alleged fraud in its procurement. The su-
3 Id. at 183.
4 362 P.2d 869 (Colo. 1961).
5 Id. at 873.
6362 P.2d 196 (Colo. 1961).
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preme court, in sustaining the judgment, held that the jurisdictional
facts alleged as fraud were those litigated and decided by the Mis-
sissippi courts and were not subject to collateral attack. The de-
fendants elected not to appear after the adverse determination on
their motion to quash and were thereafter foreclosed from ques-
tioning the same facts in the Colorado court.
RULE 30
In Appelhans v. Kirkwood,' a $10,000 judgment was entered in
favor of a fourteen-year-old plaintiff who was injured while occupy-
ing the defendant's automobile as a guest. In cross-examination of
the plaintiff, defense counsel attempted to use a pre-trial discovery
deposition in laying a foundation for impeachment. Objection was
made to the form of the question. It was then discovered that the
deposition had been corrected but not signed by the plaintiff and
had not been returned to the reporter to be certified and filed as
required by Rule 30(f). The court suppressed the deposition, even
though the plaintiff had consented to its use. The supreme court
held that the trial court violated Rule 32 (d) in that any irregularity
in the manner in which the deposition is "signed, certified, sealed
... filed, or otherwise dealt with by the officer under Rules 30 and
31 are waived unless a motion to suppress the deposition, or some
part of it, is made with reasonable promptness or with due diligence
might have been ascertained." The court also found error in the
trial court's denial of the right to refer to the deposition for the
purpose of impeachment and said that the inadmissibility of the
deposition was not put in issue until such time as the defendants
proposed to impeach the witness by introducing the deposition into
evidence. In strongly criticizing the trial court's action, the court
reviewed the right to the use of a deposition and said:
The court's subsequent action in suppressing the deposi-
tion, despite agreement by counsel for plaintiff that it be
admitted for a limited purpose, was palpably erroneous.
Defendants were entitled to refer to the deposition or any
other document which would serve to bring to the attention
of the witness any prior statement which she made looking
to ultimate impeachment. The question of the inadmissi-
bility of the deposition was not a valid issue until such time
as the defendants proposed to impeach the witness by in-
troducing the deposition. Until then it was not admissible in
evidence. Our practice, unlike that under the Federal rules,
does not permit its introduction as an admission.8
RULE 36
In McGee v. Heim,9 the plaintiff sought to recover for damages
suffered in a fire allegedly caused by the defendant's acts. The
plaintiff filed Requests for Admissions which the defendant failed
to answer. The trial judge allowed the defendant to rebut his ad-
mission as to the cause of the fire with testimony, which allowance
was sustained by the supreme court:
7 365 P.2d 233 (Colo. 1961).
9 Id at 238.
S# 362 P.2d 193 (Colo. 1961).
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In Beasley v. United States (D.C.E.D.S.C. 1948), 81 F.
"Supp. 518, 528, it was held in interpreting the equivalent
federal rule on this point that "The admissions or denials
stand in the same relation to the case that sworn evidence
bears." This does not mean, however, that a technical ad-
mission of a certain fact will prevail over uncontradicted
evidence to the contrary.
It would seem, then, that the proper effect of such an
admission would be of a purely evidential nature. It may
be contradicted or rebutted, its ultimate worth being left
to the trier of fact.
10
RULE 37 (c)
In Superior Distributing Corp. v. White," defendant refused
to make certain admissions under Rule 36 and forced the plaintiff
to take depositions, which the trial court refused to tax as costs
against the defendant. On writ of error the trial court was sustained
when the supreme court held that the awarding of costs under Rule
37 (c) is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court.
RULES 38 AND 39
In a unique personal injury action, Butters v. Wann,12 Rule 38
was again placed before the court for interpretation when the de-
fendants failed to make a timely demand for a jury trial. The court,
despite the defendants' failure to comply with Rule 38 and Rule 39,
ordered a jury trial. The defendants' demand for a jury was made
more than a year after the issues were formed. The court, relying
on Jaynes v. Marrow,13 said that it was the trial court's right and
power to order a jury trial, despite the fact that the formal require-
ments of Rule 38 were not complied with.
a In Rupp v. Cool,14 the court defined and clarified the right to
a jury trial in the district court after trial to the court in the county
court. The action was for the collection of attorney's fees and was
tried to the court, where judgment was rendered for the plaintiff.
On appeal to the district court, the defendant sought a jury, and
the right was denied. In reversing, the supreme court said:
The trial in the district court being de novo it seems
reasonable and just that the parties should not be bound in
10 Id. at 196.
11 Supra note 6.
12 363 P.2d 494 (Colo. 1961).
13 144 Colo. 138, 355 P.2d 529 (1960).
14 362 P.2d 396 (Colo. 1961).
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the district court by their demanding or failing to demand
a jury trial in the county court.
We hold that either party on appeal from the county
court to the district court should be entitled to a jury trial
in the district court in actions set forth in Rule 38. The rule
does not specifically cover the time within which demand
for jury trial should be made in cases appealed from the
county court to the district court. Under these circum-
stances, if the demand for jury trial in such cases is made
within a reasonable time prior to trial, and the trial court,
under Rule 40, R.C.P. Colo., is afforded an oppportunity to
arrange its trial calendar in an expeditious manner, the
request for jury trial should be granted. 15
The court, however, refused to place the trial of an annulment
action within the confines of Rule 38 (a) in Young v. Colorado Nat'l
Bank,16 and said that a cursory reading of the rule forces the con-
clusion that an annulment suit does not come within the meaning
of the actions enumerated in Rule 38 (a). The famous Young case
was one where both parties consented to a jury trial, and the court
elected to treat the jury as an "advisory jury." The supreme court
determined that an annulment action was a statutory action in
which the court is clothed with equity powers. In analyzing the
right to trial by jury in an annulment action, the court looked to
Rule 39 (c) and said:
It is to be observed that the headnote and the body of
the rule refer to two kinds of trials. 1. Cases not triable by
a jury may, on motion or on the court's own initiative, be
tried with an "advisory jury." 2. Non-jury cases including
non-jury statutory actions (with an exception not pertinent
here) may, by consent of court and the parties, be tried
with a "jury." In the first, an "advisory jury" acts; in the
second, a "jury" acts. If it had been intended that the "trial
by consent" be submitted to an "advisory jury," the rule
would have so stated.
This rule takes care of two differing situations. In the
first, a party may request that a non-jury case be tried to a
jury and the adversary party may resist. In such case, the
court may grant the request but, since it has been resisted,
may use the services of the jury in an advisory capacity
only. In the second, parties and court consenting, the jury's
verdict has the effect of a common law verdict.
As we construe Rule 39 (c), the trial of a non-jury ac-
tion to a jury, with the consent of both parties and the
judge, is a jury trial in its regular sense.
Where the plaintiff demands a jury trial of a non-jury
case and neither the defendant nor the court objects, con-
sent to such trial is deemed to have been given, and the
jury's verdict has "the same effect as if a jury trial had
been a matter of right." Kelly v. Shamrock Oil & Gas
Corp., 171 F.2d 909, cert. den. 337 U.S. 917. The unilateral
act of the trial court in changing the case from one of trial
15 Id. at 399.
16 365 P.2d 701 (Colo. 1961).
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by consent to one in which an advisory verdict would be
received was error; such change could only have been ac-
complished by agreement of the parties and the court.'
7
The Young case also caused the court to examine Rule 43(b)
when the right to call Young's attorney as an adverse witness for
cross-examination was before the court. The court said:
The relationship of attorney and client does not entitle
the opposing party to call the attorney under Rule 43(b),
R.C.P. Colo., to propound leading questions to him as an
adverse party or witness. Bankers Trust Co. v. International
Trust Co., 108 Colo. 15, 113 P.2d 656. Conduct of the attorney
in extraneous matters, evincing an opinion on his part that
his client is mentally competent, cannot, under the circum-
stances here present, be the subject of interrogation by call-
ing the attorney as witness as tending lo prove the compe-
tency of his client in a suit between the latter and another."
RULE 41
A real estate broker brought a contract action against a pur-
chaser of property to recover an amount overpaid or erroneously
credited to the purchaser in the real estate closing sheet which he
prepared, and his action was dismissed without prejudice for lack
of privity. The broker instituted a second action in quasi contract
and obtained judgment against the defendant. On writ of error the
defendant urged that the trial court erred by not sustaining his
defense of res judicata. The supreme court affirmed the trial court's
decision and held that the dismissal by the trial court in the first
instance was without prejudice and that Rule 41(b) did not fore-
close the plaintiff from bringing his subsequent action in quasi
contract. 19
RULE 49
In the oft decided case of O'Brien v. Wallace,2' the issues which
had been joined and tried in a will contest were again presented
to the court for review. Admission of the will to probate was op-
posed on the ground that the will was not properly executed and
for the further reason that the testator did not have the requisite
mental capacity at the time of execution. Proof of execution was
offered and not contradicted, although abundant evidence was of-
fered to show the mental incompetency of testator. Both issues were
submitted to the jury, and a general verdict was returned invali-
dating the will. In reversing, the court held that error had been
committed in not directing a verdict in favor of the proponents of
the will on the issue of execution and said that the error had been
compounded by having the jury return a general verdict. The court
said:
A general verdict upon distinct issues raised by several
pleas cannot be sustained if one of the issues should not
have been submitted to the jury. Here we have no way of
knowing upon which of the issues submitted the jury
reached its conclusion. It may have decided that Mary A.
17 Id. at 7C8.
11. Id. at 709.
19 1 Wnstrcnd v. Leach Realty Co., 364 P.2d 396 (Colo. 1961).
20 359 P.2d 1029 (Colo. 1961).
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Paige was competent but that the will was improperly exe-
cuted, such verdict could not stand for there was no testi-
mony to sustain a finding of improper execution.
21
RULE 50
In Nettrour v. J. C. Penney Co.,22 the supreme court reversed
the trial court which had granted a directed verdict in favor of the
defense. The directed verdict was granted in an action involving
injuries sustained by a five-year-old boy while he was riding the
escalator in the defendant's store. In analyzing the duties owed to
a business invitee and the evidence presented, the court reversed
and remanded and again said that a motion for a directed verdict
could be granted only where the evidence compels the conclusion
that the minds of reasonable men could not be in disagreement. The
evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,
and a motion for a directed verdict should be granted only when no
evidence has been presented, and no inference could be drawn from
2 Id. at 1030.
22 360 P .2d 964 (Colo. 1961).
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the evidence before the court, which would allow a jury verdict
against the moving party to stand.
In a wrongful death action, Sniezek v. Cimino,"3 a verdict was
directed against the plaintiff and affirmed by the supreme court,
because the evidence posed no factual theory upon which the jury
could have found negligence on the part of the defendants. The
plaintiff had also urged that the trial court erred in not submitting
an instruction which had been tendered and in allowing certain
cross-examination. The supreme court affirmed the directed verdict
with allusion to Rule 118 (f), which requires the court to "disregard
any error or defect not affecting the substantial rights of the par-
ties."
RULE 52
The findings made by the trial court pursuant to Rule 52 were
questioned in Anderson Randolph, Inc. v. Taylor,24 and Crain v.
Electrical Workers' Benefit Ass'n.2 5 The supreme court repeated the
established law that findings of a trial court are binding and con-
clusive on review, unless the evidence is wholly insufficient to sus-
stain them.
In an action to recover damages for failure to include an ease-
ment in a title insurance policy covering business property, the
defendant insurer sought to set aside the trial court's findings on
the basis that the judgment was based on the wrong grqund. The
supreme court answered the argument with the rule that "if a trial
court announces the wrong grounds or incomplete grounds for its
decision, nevertheless if proper grounds do exist therefor in the
record that it will be affirmed on review. '2 6 However, a contract
action, Murray v. Rock,27 was reversed and remanded for new trial
because of incomplete findings of fact and because the case could
not be remanded for appropriate findings of fact after the trial
judge had retired. In holding that the findings were insufficient to
comply with Rule 52, the court repeated that findings may be either
oral or written, but must be so explicit as to give the appellate
court a clear understanding of the basis of the trial court's decision
and to enable the appellate court to determine the ground on which
it reached its decision.
28
In Dollison v. Cook, -9 the trial court found for the plaintiff and
awarded damages for breach of an oral construction contract, but
failed to make a specific finding with regard to each objection made
by. the defendant. In affirming, the supreme court said there was no
competent evidence to support the findings of the trial court and
refused to reverse for failure to make specific findings.
RULE 54
In Morrissey v. Achziger3 0 the plaintiff instituted a quiet title
action naming several defendants, and all defendants were person-
ally served. Morrissey, who was a defendant, filed a cross-claim
against the defendant Burns seeking reformation of his deed from
23 360 P.2d 813 (Colo. 1961).
24 361 P.2d 142 (Colo. 1961).
25 361 P.2d 442 (Colo. 1961).
26 Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Trieder, 362 P.2d 555, 557 (Colo. 1961).
27 364 P.2d 393 (Colo. 1961).
28 See also In re Peterson's Estate, 365 P.2d 254 (Colo. 1961).
29 364 P.2d 207 (Colo. 1961).
30 364 P.2d 187 (Colo. 1961).
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Burns, but never caused service of the cross-claim to be made on
Burns. Burns defaulted and the supreme court upheld the plaintiff's
judgment, but refused to countenance the entry of a default on
Morrissey's cross-claim. The supreme court held that Burns had not
received notice of Morrissey's cross-claim and that jurisdiction did
not exist which would support a valid judgment for reformation
under Rule 54.
RULE 55
A default judgment in a forcible entry and detainer action
caused the supreme court to review not only Rule 55(b) but also
Rule 80 and Rule 98 (i), in Orebaugh v. Doskocil.31 A forcible entry
and detainer complaint was filed in the district court of Baca Coun-
ty, and a default judgment was entered by the court while sitting
at Lamar, in Prowers County. The court, in entering the default
judgment, took testimony which was not recorded by a court re-
porter and admitted five exhibits into evidence. The defendant filed
an answer after the default was taken and subsequently filed a
motion to set aside the default, alleging that the failure to answer
within the proper time was the result of excusable neglect arising
from mistake as to the time that service actually occurred. The trial
court refused to set aside the judgment. The supreme court af-
firmed, holding that excusable neglect was not a sufficient basis
for setting aside the default when not accompanied by a meritorious
defense. The defendant's answer admitted the facts necessary to
justify a judgment for forcible entry and detainer. The supreme
court also pointed out that a trial court has wide discretion in a
forcible entry and detainer action, where possession alone is in
issue, as to whether a hearing is necessary before entering a default,
and that Rule 80, which requires that evidence be taken stenogra-
phically, yielded and did not dictate a mandatory procedure in the
taking of default judgments under Rule 55(b). The defendant's
contention that error was committed by the entry of a judgment in
Prowers, rather than Baca County, was also held to be without
merit under Rule 98 (i), because the action was filed in the county
having proper venue and was held for the convenience of counsel
in Prowers County only after the defendant had defaulted.
RULE 56
Res judicata was held to be a valid basis for a summary judg-
ment under Rule 56 in Kaminsky v. Kaminsky.32 The plaintiff
sought to question a divorce decree which had been entered in her
husband's favor while she was a mental incompetent and also re-
quested an accounting of past and future support money, property
held by the husband for her account, and for the creation of a trust
relating to the property in issue. The husband's lawyer filed an af-
fidavit which incorporated a copy of the Interlocutory and Final
Decrees of Divorce in favor of the husband, in support of his motion
for a summary judgment. He also moved to dismiss the wife's claim
for an accounting on the ground that it failed to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted. In affirming the summary judgment,
the supreme court again held that res judicata can be raised in a
31359 P.2d 671 (Colo. 1961).
32 359 P.2d 675 (Colo. 1961).
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motion for summary judgment and upheld the attorney's affidavit
which had certified copies of the judgment of the county court at-
tached to it as being in full compliance with Rule 56 (e). The court,
however, reversed the trial court for dismissing the wife's suit for
equitable relief, including an accounting.
A summary judgment under Rule 56 has seldom been sustained
by the supreme court. Norton v. Dartmouth Skis, Inc.,33 upheld a
summary judgment which had been granted on the basis of the
affirmative defense of the statute of limitations. The plaintiff's
claim was for commissions, and the sole issue was whether the de-
fendant corporation had absented itself from the State of Colorado
so as to toll the statute of limitations. The supreme court, in uphold-
ing the trial judge's determination on the affidavits, said:
By the affidavits filed in support of the motion for sum-
mary judgment as provided in Rule 56, Colorado R.C.P., the
court had such facts before it as to enable it to determine
whether the defendant was present in the state for the pur-
poses of service. The affidavit complied with Rule 56(e)
R.C.P. Colo., which provides in part that "* * * shall be
made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as
would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirma-
tively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters
stated therein. * * *"34
A summary judgment was also upheld in Broadway Roofing &
Supply, Inc. v. Cameron,35 when the record disclosed that a con-
struction contract did not bind the purchasers of property. The facts
appearing before the court by way of affidavit established that
there was no issue as to any material fact, and the defendant was
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
RULE 59
Rule 59 was construed in several eases during 1961. In Boyd v.
Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 6 the jury returned a verdict for the de-
fendant and judgment of dismissal as to the defendant was entered.
Thereafter, the plaintiff successfully urged a motion for a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict when defense counsel failed to appear.
The supreme court refused to consider, as a motion for new trial,
the defendant's motion to reconsider the motion for judgment not-
withstanding the verdict under Rule 50 (b). The court dismissed the
writ of error for failure to file a motion for a new trial in compli-
ance with Rule 59 (f).
The $175,681 wrongful death verdict in the ubiquitous falling
telephone pole case was not reinstated by the supreme court after
a new trial was awarded by the trial court.37 The plaintiffs had at-
tempted in the trial court to limit the issues on retrial to damages
alone and had sought to have the verdict reinstated in the supreme
court. In upholding the trial court, the supreme court held that an
original proceeding was not proper when an adequate review was
available by writ of error. The issues framed could not be deter-
mined in the supreme court without a record, and the matters be-
33 364 P.2d 866 (Colo. 1961).
34 Ibid.35 362 P.2d 393 (Cola. 1961).
36365 P.2d 813 (Colo. 1961).
37 Piper v. District Court, 364 P.2d 213 (Colo. 1961).
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fore the supreme court forced the conclusion that the trial court
was within its discretion in ordering a new trial.
Cortviendt v. Cortviendt s merely reiterated the truism that
Rule 59 serves as a prerequisite to review by writ of error, and the
court refused to honor the plaintiff's efforts to extend the period
for review with a motion to vacate under Rule 60 and held that a
valid judgment is not reviewable by writ of error. Of like effect is
Dry Cleaners & Laundry Workers v. Sunnyside Cleaners,311 where
the court summarily refused to consider grounds for reversal not
previously raised before the trial court and grounds not specified in
the motion for a new trial.
RULE 81
In Swingle v. Pollo's Estate,40 a beneficiary under a will ap-
pealed from the allowance of a claim against the estate from the
county court to the district court. The appeal was dismissed for
failure to file a bond in the district court within ten days and for
the further reason that the bond was insufficient in amount. The
bond in issue was filed late, but was approved by the judge of the
county court within the ten-day period, and, admittedly, the county
judge had the power to grant an extension of time for the filing and
approval of the bond. In attacking the insufficiency of the bond and
the timeliness of filing, no proof was offered to show the deficiency
of the bond. The supreme court upheld the sufficiency of the bond
and the timeliness of filing and declared that a beneficiary under
a will who appeals from the allowance of a claim need make only
a cost bond, and not a bond in twice the amount appealed from, and,
therefore, reversed and remanded for trial on the merits, since no
proof appeared in the record to show that the bond was deficient.
RULE 97
In Kovacheff v. Langhart,41 a failure to honor a motion to dis-
qualify, which was supported by affidavits charging that the trial
judge disliked the plaintiff's attorney, was upheld by the supreme
court on the ground that facts did not appear which would justify
or compel disqualification of the trial judge.
RULE 101
The focal point of Grant v. Gwyn' 2 was the right to a body
execution which was issued in a brutal assault case. The defendant
moved to set aside the body execution, relying on Canon City v.
Merris,' 43 and claimed that the imposition of a sentence in the Muni-
cipal Court of Denver prohibited the imposition of execution against
the body of the defendant. The trial court had submitted the proper
interrogatory to the jury on the question of whether the defendant
was guilty of a willful and wanton disregard of the rights and safety
of the plaintiff and had properly instructed the jury on the issue of
exemplary damages. After a verdict was rendered in favor of the
plaintiff, the trial court ordered that a body execution be issued.
The defendant's motion to set aside the body execution on the basis
:3x 361 P.2d 767 (Colo. 1961).
39 360 P.2d 446 (Colo. 1961).
40 360 P.2d 808 (Colo. 1961).
41 363 P.2d 702 (Colo. 1961).
42 365 P.2d 256 (Colo. 1961).
4:1 137 Colo. 169, 323 P.2d 614 (1958'.
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of her conviction for assault in the municipal court was made after
the body execution was ordered, and the supreme court held that
the motion was in time under Rule 101 (a) because body execution
had not issued at the time the motion was filed.
RULE 103
In upholding a garnishment and the trial court's ruling on the
garnishee's traverse, in Field Family Constr. Co. v. Ryan,4 4 the su-
preme court said:
[W] here one, for a valuable consideration, has assumed
the obligation of another to plaintiff, he may be held liable
as garnishee .... The assumption of the debts of another
when in proper form is a right, credit or chose in action
required to be reported in garnishment proceedings under
Rule 103 (a), R.C.P. Colo.
45
In Loveland v. American Founders Life Ins. Co.,4 6 an attempt
was made to collect on a judgment for American Founders obtained
against Colorado Management Corporation, and execution was is-
sued which was supported by a writ of garnishment. Pursuant to
the writ, Loveland delivered stock certificates in her possession to
the clerk and asserted a claim against the certificates and the Colo-
rado Management Corporation. Error was asserted for failure to
require the garnishee's claim to be honored before the certificates
were released, and the supreme court dismissed the writ of error
because no final judgment was present for review.
In Rockey v. McCauley,47 error was predicated on the trial
court's dismissal of a traverse in a garnishment proceeding. The
right to set-off was in issue when Rockey attempted to enforce his
judgment against Klepping by serving a garnishee summons on
McCauley, who had suffered judgment in a suit instituted by Klep-
ping against him. McCauley answered the garnishment by claiming
that he also held judgments against Klepping and was entitled to
set-off. Rockey traversed the answer, denying McCauley's owner-
ship of the judgments at the time of the garnishment. Thereafter,
McCauley moved to dismiss the traverse and to have his set-off
approved in the action where Klepping had obtained his judgment,
and both motions were honored. On writ of error, the trial court
was reversed for failure to allow Rockey a hearing on his traverse
and for granting a set-off in favor of McCauley to Rockey's detri-
ment in an action where Rockey was not a party. The supreme court
said that the rights became fixed and should have been determined
on the issues raised by the answer and traverse on the date that the
garnishee summons was served.
RULE 106
A. Certiorari and Mandamus
In Ahern v. Baker,48 the retail package liquor dealers sought by
declaratory judgment and mandamus to force the secretary of state
to carry out certain mandatory provisions of the liquor code deal-
ing with home delivery of package liquor and prayed that the con-
44 360 P.2d 110 (Colo. 1961).
45 Ibid.
46 361 P.2d 967 (Colo. 1961).
47366 P.2d 138 (Colo. 1961).
48366 P.2d 366 (Colo. 1961).
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stitutionality of the liquor code be determined. The trial court dis-
missed the action, and the dismissal was upheld by the supreme
court when it found that there was no controversy and all the par-
ties before the court were not present. In reviewing the matter, the
supreme court found that the complaint was insufficient to bring
the action within Rule 106, whether the proceeding be considered
as certiorari or mandamus. There were no proceedings before the
secretary of state for the court to review, and no complaint was
voiced which urged that the secretary had exceeded his jurisdiction,
and since the secretary of state had not acted, he could not have
abused his discretion. Mandamus also was not proper because no
clear legal right to demand the performance of an act was shown
or clear legal duty to act was established; therefore, the trial court's
dismissal was affirmed.
Middle of the night justice, as the supreme court designated the
action of a justice of the peace, was not in harmony with due pro-
cess of law under the Fourteenth Amendment.4 9 Strohl was taken
before the justice court late at night, after having been involved
in an automobile collision, and charged with driving on the wrong
side of the road and under the influence of liquor. He pleaded guilty
and paid the fine on the representation that he could then go on
his way, but without disclosure of the fact that he faced the loss
of his driver's license by reason of his plea. Thereafter, he sought
relief in the district court under Rule 106(a)(4) in the nature of
certiorari. The district court held the proceedings before the justice
of the peace to be void, and on writ of error the supreme court up-
held the propriety of the use of the extraordinary remedy and found
that Strohl had no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law. In
considering the propriety of taking evidence in the course of a hear-
ing under writ of certiorari, the court recognized that although cer-
tiorari is a proceeding to review the proceedings in an inferior
tribunal, testimony may be taken on the issue of jurisdiction pro-
vided that no disputed questions of fact were determined. Accord-
ingly, the case was remanded for a proper hearing in the justice of
the peace court.
A writ of mandamus did not take the place of a writ of error in
Mar-Lee Corp. v. Steele.50 The controversy before the court arose
when restrictive covenants on residential property were construed
49 Toland v. Strohl, 364 P.2d 588 (Colo. 1961).
50 359 P.2d 364 (Colo. 1961).
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to allow the construction of a church. The proceeding was com-
menced as a class action and service was not effected on all property
owners in the area affected by the covenants. The trial court refused
to recognize the proceeding as a class action within Rule 23 and
ordered that all persons be served if the action was to continue.
Thereafter, without a record, a petition for a writ of mandamus was
filed in the supreme court. The supreme court held that the peti-
tioners could have obtained a dismissal by standing on the record
in the trial court and would thereby have made review possible
by writ of error. The petition for a writ of mandamus was improper,
because an adequate remedy was available by way of writ of error,
once the case was dismissed in the trial court.
B. Prohibition
The court issued a writ of prohibition in Lopez v. Smith,
5' to
restrain a county court from hearing and determining a writ of
habeas corpus which was filed in aid of adoption proceedings. Smith
had custody of the disputed child for fourteen years and obtained
the child when the parents voluntarily relinquished the child to
him. The parents then took the child, and Smith looked to adoption
proceedings and a writ of habeas corpus in the county court to re-
gain custody of the child. In upholding the parents' use of original
proceedings and prohibition in the supreme court, the record recog-
nized Smith's equities and said:
Unquestionably habeas corpus is an available remedy
to adjudicate custody of children under certain circum-
stances. . . . But a stranger lacks standing to maintain
habeas corpus looking to an award of custody as against
parents of the child who are presumed to be entitled to the
custody.... One who seeks custody through habeas corpus
must show a prima facie right to custody.
52
The court concluded that the county court lacked jurisdiction,
and the rule to show cause was made absolute.
Scheer v. District Court,5" brought a writ of prohibition before
the court when an attempt was made to prosecute a father under
the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act after he had
successfully divorced his wife in Colorado and had obtained a decree
of divorce reserving the issue of child support and custody until
his wife returned his children to Colorado. The wife had the chil-
dren in Nevada and brought suit under the Act. The supreme court
discharged the writ and held that. the divorce decree did not pro-
hibit the district court from proceeding under the Act, since the
divorce decree did not exclude other remedies and the duties to
support the minor children were absolute and could be enforced
through the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act.
In Rabinoff v. District Court,54 the supreme court reviewed the
constitutionality of the Urban Renewal Act and upheld the juris-
diction of the district court when original proceedings were in-
stituted for review by certiorari or, in the alternative, for prohibi-
tion, to challenge the jurisdiction of the district court to hear con-
51 360 P.2d 967 (Colo. 1961).
52 Id. at 969.
53 363 P.2d 1059 (Colo. 1961).
54360 P.2d 114 (Colo. 1961).
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demnation proceedings which were instituted in connection with
the Urban Renewal Act. The constitutionality of the Act was upheld
and the rule to show cause was discharged.
RULE 107
In Wall v. District Court,55 the supreme court upheld a fine
for contempt against an attorney, even though the record reflected
no conduct which was worthy of punishment. The court held that
the trial court's findings as to factual matters were conclusive and
directed attention to the inanimate record which the court felt did
not reflect demeanor, facial expressions, mannerisms, and other
conduct of the party which would not take the form of the printed
word.
RULE 111
Rule 111 furnished the basis for the dismissal of a writ of error
in Herzog v. Murad,56 after the plaintiff in a personal injury action
had successfully argued that an additur should be granted to the
jury verdict which had been returned in his favor. The trial court
granted the request for an additur and ordered that, if the defend-
ant elected not to pay the additional sum ordered by the court, a
new trial would be held on the issue of damages alone. The defend-
ant sought to review the ruling by writ of error but did not obtain
a final judgment in accordance with the trial court's ruling, and the
case was, therefore, dismissed without prejudice to the defendant
and with the full right to review the proceeding in the trial court
after final judgment was entered.
In England v. Colorado Agency Co.,5 7 the supreme court was
asked to review a temporary injunction and a sentence for con-
tempt. No supersedeas was obtained from the supreme court, and
in affirming the judgment of the trial court, the supreme court
found the sentence for contempt to be supported by the record and
held that the mere issuance of the writ of error did not stay pro-
ceedings in the trial court.
Failure to obtain a final judgment resulted in dismissal of a
writ of error in Weaver v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co.58 The defendant's
unsuccessful argument to bring in third-party defendants in a mort-
gage foreclosure suit caused the matter to appear before the su-
preme court in the Weaver case. When the defendant's motion to
bring in third parties was denied, the defendant petitioned for a
writ of prohibition, and the writ was denied. Finally, the defendant
sued out a writ of error which also resulted in dismissal because
the supreme court ruled that the trial court's denial of the motion
to bring in third parties was not a final order subject to review by
writ of error.
A writ of error was also dismissed in Mason v. Benson, 9 when
the supreme court found that the writ of error was not sought in
apt time and that the parties who sought to review an adoption
proceeding were not parties to the action and had no standing before
the court.
55 360 P.2d 452 (Colo. 1961).
56363 P.2d 645 (Colo. 1961).
57 359 P.2d I (Colo. 1961).
58 360 P.2d 807 (Colo. 1961).
59 361 P.2d 349 (Colo. 1961).
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outside state until after certain dates a lawyer can - in many states, on many
different dates -save his client the cost of a year's tax. Or he can save his
client the bother of preparing and filing a state tax return. In some instances
both the tax and the bother can be saved.
CT maintains such data by date and state. It is available to lawyers (only)
without charge or obligation. Check on such possible savings before you pro-
ceed with qualification [or incorporation] of a client in any state, Canadian
province, U. S. territory or possession.
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annual costs, qualification requirements
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each Canadian province, each U. S. terri-
tory and possession. They contain summa-
ries of all data needed by the lawyer to
complete qualification forms for the juris-
diction in which qualification is to be
effected.
5. Information from which the lawyer, by
comparison, can determine odvisability of
incorporating a separate corporation
rather than qualifying the existing corpo-
ration.
6. CT's continent-wide system of offices
and representatives to expedite the filing
of the lawyer's papers.
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